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1.  Introduction
Adherence to fixed parities and convertibility of  national currencies into gold served as a
signal of financial rectitude or a “good housekeeping seal of approval” during the classical gold
standard era from 1870-1914.  Peripheral countries that adhered faithfully to the gold standard
rule had access at better terms to capital from the core countries of Western Europe than did
countries with poor records of adherence (Bordo and Rockoff, 1996)
1.  In this paper we extend
the approach developed in that paper to ascertain whether the “good housekeeping seal” was also
an important institution under the interwar gold exchange standard, which prevailed only from
1925 to 1931.
In simplest terms, the “good housekeeping seal” hypothesis views the gold standard as a
commitment mechanism.  Adherence to the fixed parity of gold required that members follow
domestic monetary and fiscal policies and have other institutions of financial probity (such as
having a monetary authority which holds gold reserves) consistent with long-run maintenance of
the peg.  It also signaled to potential overseas lenders that the borrowers were “good people”.
2
An important part of the hypothesis is that the gold standard should be viewed as a
“contingent rule” or a rule with escape clauses.  Members were expected to adhere to
convertibility except in the event of  a well-understood emergency such as a war, a financial
crisis, or a shock to the terms of trade.  Under these circumstances, temporary departures from
the rule would be tolerated on the assumption that once the emergency passed, convertibility at
the original parity would resume (Bordo and  Kydland, 1995).
                                                        
1 Also see Flandreau et al (1998).
2 Our approach is similar to but not the same as the signaling hypothesis first developed by  Spence (1974).3
An implication of the contingent rule is that the countries which returned to gold parity at
a devalued parity after an emergency would be judged as having “weak resolve” and countries
which never returned to gold or never adhered would be even worse.  In other words, following
the gold standard rule served as a signal, other things equal, to lenders that these loans would be
safe, both in the sense that they would not be defaulted upon and in the sense that they would not
be repaid in a devalued currency.  Hence they would charge a lower risk premium to these
borrowers than to borrowing countries which were not good gold standard adherents.
In Bordo and Rockoff (1996) we tested thi s hypothesis for 9 widely different capital
importing countries.  We found that the risk premium charged on loans in London was lowest for
a group of orthodox gold standard countries that never left gold, slightly higher for those
countries that temporarily devalued, and still higher for those countries that temporarily left gold
and permanently devalued or that never adhered.  In this paper we extend this methodology to
the interwar gold exchange standard.
The interwar gold exchange standard generally h as a bad press.  It only lasted six years
before collapsing in the debacle of the Great Depression.  It is viewed as a flawed attempt to
restore the glories of the classical gold standard.  Its flaws included the fact that the principle
member, the United States, did not deflate sufficiently after the inflation of World War I to
restore the real price of gold to its pre-war level, hence imparting a deflationary bias on the
system once other countries restored convertibility (Johnson, 1997).  It was also flawed because
the United Kingdom rejoined gold at an overvalued parity while France did the opposite.  Most
important however was the fact that the US and France each followed policies of sterilizing gold
inflows that exacerbated the underlying disequilibrium.
3
                                                        
3  Other flaws stressed in the literature include: the use of multiple reserve countries; an incipient “Triffin dilemma”
that the use of foreign exchange as a substitute for increasingly scarce gold would expose the center countries to a4
Despite its flaws and bad press, there is compelling evidence that capital markets in the
1920’s  were  as well integrated between the core countries (the US, UK, France and Germany) as
they were before the War (Officer 1998,  Hallwood and  MacDonald, 1998).  Also, as we
elaborate below, the core counties and most nations attached the highest importance to restoring
the gold standard.  The gold  standard which was restored however was based on somewhat
different rules than the pre-war variant.   It was a gold exchange standard based on the
recommendations of the Genoa Conference of 1922 in which members were encouraged to
substitute foreign exchange in dollars or pounds for scarce gold, and the central reserve countries
(the US, UK, and later France) were to hold reserves only in the form of gold.  Also, gold
adherence was explicitly a part of a package of financial orthodoxy encouraged for all members.
The packages, first imposed as a part of the League of Nations’ stabilization arrangements for the
former belligerents, included an independent central bank, a balanced budget and gold
convertibility.  The package was extended through the efforts of  Montagu Norman, Benjamin
Strong and Edwin Kemmerer to many peripheral countries.
In sum, one would expect t hat the “good housekeeping seal” hypothesis should hold in
the interwar as it did before World War I.  Several important differences between the two
regimes however (aside from the flaws of the gold exchange standard) will influence our
approach to testing it.  The first change is that the mantle of principle lender was passed from the
UK to the US, so that most lending to the periphery originated in New York, rather than London.
The second difference is that most countries went back to gold at devalued parities.  The third is
that most countries used foreign exchange as a substitute for gold reserves.
                                                                                                                                                                                       
speculative attack as their outstanding liabilities increased relative to their gold reserves; and a lack of credibility
compared to the classical gold standard.  Because most countries after World War I were concerned with domestic
policy goals (the level of real output and employment) their resolve to defend their parities in the face of speculative
attack was weakened (Eichengreen, 1992).5
Section 2 of the paper discusses the restoration of the gold standard in the early 1920’s,
focusing on the diplomatic efforts by the British, and the development of a new order in
international finance.  Following the  Cunliffe Report (1918), the official position was to restore
the halcyon days of the pre-war when London was the world’s principal capital market.  The
efforts to  return  to gold were strongly supported by the US.  The process we describe includes
concerted policies by the League of Nations and the financial powers to stabilize many countries
and private missions to establish central banks.   Although the British were the strongest
advocates of a return to the “status quo ex ante”, they were faced with the growing reality, based
on the fact that to finance World War I they had cashed in their overseas assets and borrowed
heavily from the US, and after they returned to gold at the original parity in April 1925 that they
were under continuous balance of payments pressure, that they did not have the resources to
restore the lending network that they had before the war.  This was manifested in a series of
embargoes on foreign lending in the 1920’s.  For these reasons, and as an extension of its lending
activity to the belligerents that developed during World War I, the US stepped into the breach.
Section 3 describes the evolution of the US role as principal foreign lender.  The rise of
the US reflected both an extension of wartime lending and its emergence as the strongest
economic power.  We also consider the indictment that US lending standards were not as strict as
those of the British .  Although many of the loans issued in the 1920’s were defaulted upon in the
1930’s, the shock of the Great Depression likely was the main reason for the poor performance.
Section 4 presents our empirical evidence for the “good housekeeping seal” hypothesis.
Based on data for 40 countries for 9 years, we estimated a pooled cross-section, time series
regression of the interest rates of countries borrowing in the US on several measures of gold
standard adherence (whether a country adhered to gold, whether it devalued and whether it was6
on a gold exchange or gold bullion standard) and a set of macroeconomic and other institutional
fundamentals.  The results strongly confirm those found for the classical gold standard.  They
show that countries that adhered to gold at whatever parity received better terms than those that
did not, and that countries that did not devalue when they returned to gold did better than those
that did.  Section 5 concludes.
2.   Restoring the Gold Standard
Economic, Political and Social Conditions as World War I Ended.
At the end of World War I, the  United States, Great Britain, France, Germany and many
other nations, belligerents or neutral, had swollen money supplies, large debts, large immediate
expenditure needs and moderate levels of taxation.  All of the belligerents had increased taxes
during the war but most of the financing for the war's immense budgets derived from new
government debt and money creation.  While post-war expenditure needs were lower, even war
time levels of taxation were quite inadequate.
Perhaps the most troublesome element  affecting economic life was the demand for
reparations.  The European Allied victors expected post-World War I reparations would cover
government budget gaps, especially the severely war damaged countries of Belgium and France.
Reparations were also expected to help pay the inter-Allied loans from the United States as the
war’s net creditor.  For Germany the threat and extent of the highly disputed reparations clouded
any attempt by its new government to create a stable fiscal and monetary environment for its
economy.
An important new element in post-war European politics of finance was that Europe's
working classes had become a much more significant force in national politics.  All of the7
warring states had made great efforts to gain the support of the working classes and their
organizations.  Having disproportionately suffered in the war's human toll, some political
accommodation to these new voices was certain.  Perhaps as important, the 1917 Russian
revolution established a communist  government which openly encouraged the working classes of
Europe to overthrow their capitalist systems.
Finally, all of the warring states and many of the neutrals had been subjected to
significant wartime inflation.  Except for the United States, the gold standard was suspended by
all of the belligerents and many neutrals.  From 1914 to 1919 the cost of living multiplied by 1.7
times in the United States, 2.2 in the United Kingdom, 2.7 in France, and 4.0 in Germany.
4
Through a variety of currency and capital controls Great Britain had uniquely managed to
maintain the dollar-pound exchange rate very close to the pre-World War I level throughout the
war.  However, in March 1919, four months after the  war ended Britain was forced to let the
pound float.
Considering the Post-War Monetary Standard in 1918-1919
It was thus under these conditions that the question of a post-World War I international
monetary system and  standard was considered by contemporaries.  Although there were a few
dissenting voices, the dominant view of governments and central banks in Europe and elsewhere
was that a return to the pre-World War I gold standard was highly desirable.
The clear expression of this desire in Great Britain was the Report of the  Cunliffe
Committee.  The committee produced an interim report in August 1918 and a brief final report in
December 1918, just after the November Armistice.
5
                                                        
4 .  Mitchell (1975, 743-4).  U. S. Department of Commerce (1975, Series E135).
5 .   First Interim Report of Cunliffe Committee (Cd. 9182).  The conclusions of the Interim and Final Reports, as well as
the Committee's terms of reference, are reprinted in Sayers (1976, 57-64).8
The August 1918 Interim Report firmly held that Britain should return to the gold
standard without delay.  The Committee was concerned with the adverse balance of payments,
the "undue" growth of credit, and the prospect of a drain leading to a note issue convertibility
crisis.   Conditions which the Committee thought would be necessary for a return to the gold
standard included a cessation of government borrowing, rehabilitation of an effective Bank of
England discount rate, and the restoration of the rules governing the currency and note issues and
their required reserve backing in the Bank of England's Banking Department.
With regard to gold, the  Cunliffe Committee felt that there was no need for an early
resumption of internal circulation of gold or  bank gold holdings.  Gold imports should be free of
restriction while permission for gold exports should be obtained from the Bank of England.
£150 million in gold would be a suitable reserve.
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In the event, the British balance of payments and fiscal pressures proved too much for the
rapid implementation of the  Cunliffe recommendations.  In late March 1919 official support of
the wartime $4.76 pound was removed and  the next month gold exports were prohibited by law.
Coinciding with the movement to fluctuating exchange rates, the Treasury began to free
the capital market from wartime controls. In March 1919 a Treasury notice revised the guidelines
for new issues for the still operating wartime Capital Issues Committee.  Overseas issues were
now permitted , preference being given to those new issues whose proceeds were expended in the
United Kingdom, those assisting United Kingdom trade, and Dominion issues.  Then, in August
and November of 1919 the Defense of the Realm  regulations which mandated government
regulation of the capital market were repealed.
                                                        
6 .  The final report was issued December 3, 1919; it briefly reasserted the conclusions of the Interim Report: Final Report
of Cunliffe Com. (Cd. 464).9
Yet, in early 1920  Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England, began to use a
policy instrument which heretofore had never been a Bank of England's peacetime policy tool,
that is, privately arranged capital embargoes.
7  Its earliest use seems to have been an embargo on
short-term foreign government borrowing, most likely to facilitate the British Treasury's short-
term debt refunding operations.
8  This first private embargo proved effective ; unlike 1919 and
1921 there were no foreign government issues in London in 1920.
9  Interestingly, some European
short-term government borrowers who would have been welcomed in London (or Paris) in the
recent past found funding in New York during the embargo year.
10   This development heralded
the shifting of the mantle of the world’s center for international finance from London to New
York in the following years.
Of th e major economies of the world, only the United States was on a fully functioning
gold standard, as it had been, with very limited restrictions, throughout the war.
11   Britain was
with the overwhelming majority of nations in the immediate post-war years in carrying on its
international transactions with a floating exchange rate.  Like Britain these other nations were
buffeted by variable exchange rates, inflation and difficult government fiscal problems, and this
was a state of financial affairs which did not sit well with their governments or the financial
world.
                                                        
7 .  Atkin (1977, 28 )   Atkin examines the embargoes throughout the 1920’s.  See also  Moggridge (1971) covering the
1924-1931 years.
8 .  In May 1920, Norman's diaries note that he had informally arranged with three principal brokers a queue favoring
local authority housing and domestic manufacturing firms first, and then, in descending preference, other domestic firms,
Dominion and colonial borrowers and, last, foreign borrowers: Sayers (1976, 288).
9 .  Atkin (1977, 155).
10 .  According to Lewis (1938, 640-641), the Belgian and Italian national governments obtained short-term funding from
the U. S. in 1920.
11 .   As of 1919, the United States and Cuba were a gold standard with circulating gold coins while Nicaragua, Panama,
and the Philippines were on a gold exchange standard.  China was on a silver standard.10
Brussels and Genoa: The International Conferences of 1920 and 1922.
In 1920 at Brussels and 1922 at Genoa, conferences were convened to seek solutions for
Europe's evolving post-war financial disorders.  At these conferences the first attempts were
made to reestablish the international gold standard.  Neither of these conferences led the
participating nations to move together to implement this goal.  Yet, the financial policies
concerning national fiscal and currency stabilization which were articulated in the resolutions of
these conferences represented a strongly held consensus view on how stabilization might
individually proceed, if not in international concert.  It is also noteworthy that everyone attending
these conferences accepted that fiscal and currency stabilization was a necessary preface for the
currency link to gold.  Thus, it seems fair to suggest that the Brussels and Genoa conferences
articulated a path, a set of fiscal and banking principals and practices which, if implemented,
would make the restoration of the gold standard much easier.
Brussels.   It was the Council of the League of Nations that called for a Commission on
Currency and Exchange to meet in Brussels.  Given the reluctance of the U. S. Congress to allow
the United States to join the League, American participation consisted of an unofficial observer
from the United States Treasury.  Even so, as the principal post-war international creditor,
American views influenced the proceedings and resolutions, especially Washington's negative
view towards the establishment of an international central bank or international credit bank.
Until Allied debts to the United States were properly scheduled, private, short-term lending from
the United States was the method for dealing with European financial needs approved by
Washington.11
The resolutions of the Brussels Commission viewed the growth of inflation as a key
cause of disorganization of business, dislocation of exchanges, the increase in the cost of living
and labor unrest, and thus a phenomena making it much more difficult to return to pre-war gold
parities.
12    Inflation could be stopped by abstaining from increasing the currency.  The chief
cause of excessive currency expansion was excessive government expenditure.  Governments
had to limit their current expenditures to their current revenues and avoid all "superfluous"
expenditures.  Banks, especially Banks of Issue, "should be freed of political pressure and should
be conducted solely on lines of prudent finance."
13   Additional credit creation and new floating
government debt should cease; repayment or funding should begin.
With regard to an international monetary standard, Brussels' Resolution VIII stated that a
return to the gold standard was highly desirable, but it was impossible to forecast when the older
countries would be able to return "to their former measure of effective gold standard or how long
it would take the newly formed countries to establish such a standard".
14    "Deflation, if and
when undertaken, had to be carried out gradually and with great caution."
15
A notable resolution of the Brussels Conference was a call for the creation of central
banks in countries where none were currently in place and  " ..  if the assistance of foreign capital
were required for the promotion of such a Bank some form of international control might be
required."
16   This latter phrase was all that remained of the hotly debated ideas for an
                                                        
12 .  Sayers (1976, 69-73).  Many of the key international and British monetary documents of the interwar decades are
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13 .  Sayers (1976, 70)
14 .  Sayers (1976, 70).
15 .  Sayers (1976, 72).
16 .  Sayers (1976, 73).12
international bank of issue and an international credit bank, opposed by the United States'
unofficial delegate, among others.  But, it does adumbrate the idea, if not the specifics, of the
League's later financial  missions which were to begin in 1922.
Genoa.   The Genoa Conference of April-May 1922 was the second international
conference called by the Council of Allies to address the continued national and international
financial instability.  Called with the support of Great Britain, France, Belgium, Italy and Japan,
it was hoped, again unrequited, that the Americans would send official representation.  Perhaps
the most active planning for the Genoa Conference was undertaken by the Bank of England and
the U. K. Treasury, with a fairly heavy input from  Montagu Norman, the Bank's Governor.
17
Draft proposals brought to Genoa by the British delegation were among those accepted by the
conference's Financial Commission.
A set of widely agreed upon economic and political conditions for national fiscal and
currency stabilization, quite similar to the Brussels' list, formed an important part of the final
conference resolutions.  The most controversial Genoa proposals were three important
resolutions concerning international monetary  arrangements, quickly named the gold exchange
standard.   These were: (1) central banks should conduct their credit policy so as to avoid undue
fluctuations in the purchasing power of gold; (2) central banks were to cooperate continuously
                                                        
17 .  A draft of proposed resolutions was circulated and shared with, among others, Benjamin Strong, the Governor of
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1914-1928.  Strong was Norman's closest American contact with the Federal
Reserve System and New York's financial markets.  Strong's links to the Bank of England stemmed from the Federal
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world's largest industrial power.  From the beginning of Norman's Bank career, Strong and Norman carried on a frequent
and extremely frank correspondence.  Indeed, Norman had visited the United States in September 1921 to improve the
Bank of England's relations with the Federal Reserve System, both beginning and ending his stay with Strong in New
York: Clay (1957); Chandler (1958);  Sayers (1986 [1976] , ).13
with each other; and (3) central banks were divided into two groupings - (a) the central countries
which were to hold their international reserves entirely in gold and (b) the other nations
(unnamed) which were to hold their international reserves partly in gold and partly in foreign
exchange, that is, short-term credits on the center countries.  International reserves, in other
words, could be highly liquid credits placed in the center countries.
In formulating these proposals Norman and the Bank of England saw the world's supply
of gold as limited.  Britain herself had taken gold coin out of circulation to conserve Britain's
holdings.  However, it was also the case that these gold exchange standard proposals served
national British interests, as was recognized by the U. S. and France, the other "central"
economies.
The British could expect to have a very l arge share of these short-term credits deposited
in London by the world's lesser central banks.  Regardless of any temporary embargo on long-
term foreign borrowers, Britain remained the dominant market for short-term credit funding of
world trade in the early 1920s.  Furthermore, these London sterling deposits of foreign banks
could be a very accessible source of temporary reserves for the Bank of England when, as
happened in the years 1906-1910, the Bank was subject to pressures from Britain's balance of
payments.
18
The Return of Gold, 1922-1931.
In 1919, there were five nations in the world on the gold standard, the United States,
Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama and the Philippines.  Notably, the latter four were closely linked to the
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U. S.  By end of 1922 Costa Rica, Salvador and Lithuania had restored their link to the standard.
Of these seven, Cuba and the United States were on a gold coin standard , the rest were on a gold
exchange standard.  At the peak of the interwar gold standard in 1929, forty-six nations were part
of the gold standard system.  China remained on the silver standard while Russia, Turkey,
Portugal and Spain continued to maintain fluctuating exchange rates.  Thus, in a much shorter
space of time than characterized the spread of the gold standard in the 19th century, most of the
world's nation states and their empires had rejoined the gold standard.
Obviously, there were economic incentives for such return.  Restoring the gold standard
meant the direct and indirect costs of exchange rate fluctuation were sharply  minimized which,
in turn, could have important effects on the costs of short- and long-term finance and the volume
of trade.  Moreover, a nation on the gold standard was a  nation which was likely to keep its
government expenditures in line with its tax revenues and thus not meet any large portion of its
expenditures with paper money creation.  Furthermore, a gold standard government was likely to
think that international commerce and finance was a valuable aspect of national economic and
social progress.  Finally, a gold standard country was not likely to single out foreign businesses
for differential treatment in taxation or in courts of contract law.
Even with these advantages for a nation state the immediate economic costs of restorin g
the gold standard might be quite high, often involving ending an inflationary fiscal policy with
significant output and employment effects.  It was also politically difficult, particularly in nations
where the working classes were finding their voice on matters of taxation and government
expenditure and the wealthy classes were unwilling to accept an altered burden.  As Eichengreen
(1992) makes abundantly clear, new taxes and new expenditures supported by newly widened
voting franchises and stronger working class parties were a significant and widespread stumbling15
block in attempts to restore the gold standard during the 1920s.  Indeed these factors as well as
the  extent to which the price level had to decline, determined whether countries would return to
gold at the prewar parity or at devalued rates.
When the gold standard was restored in the 1920s it usually involved several stages, with
national fiscal and currency stabilization coming first, often accompanied by the creation or
reform of the central bank.  Then, the nation might move to de facto exchange rate stabilization
in terms of gold, with de  jure exchange rate stabilization somewhat later.
International Financial Missionaries
In the early stages of national fiscal and currency stabilization a nd sometimes in the later
process of gold standard restoration, the speed and character of the process was frequently and
importantly affected by foreign missions.  The 1920s must be the most intense decade of
financial missionary activity the world had ever seen.  The League of Nations sent financial
missions to advise Central and Eastern Europe.  British, American, and French central bankers
officially and unofficially offered advice and financial help.  The American economist
Kemmerer and other private financial experts were widely used in Latin America and elsewhere.
The common ideology of these missions was forged in the Brussels and Genoa meetings
and defined more sharply through each mission's experience.   Brown later summarized these
ideas, calling them a program of cooperation: "to balance national budgets and stop inflation; to
direct the flow of long term capital to countries financially and economically disorganized by the
war and to safeguard that capital; to generalize and develop the institution of central banking and
safeguard the independence of central banks; to adopt measures of gold economy; to reach a
settlement of past debts".
19
                                                        
19 .  Brown (1940, 346).  The ideas can be repeatedly found in League of Nation reports and annuals.  What is equally
important is their frequent mention in the correspondence of Norman and  Strong in the 1920s.  Perhaps the most famous16
The League of Nations Missions.  In August of 1922 Austria asked the Allied  Powers for
financial help and was referred to the Council of the League of Nations.  A mission was set up to
investigate Austria's financial problems and make recommendations.  Norman was deeply
involved from the start, having a hand in the appointment of several members of the Austrian
mission.  In March 1923 new statutes for an Austrian central bank emerged and the Bank of
England issued a 12-month loan (March 1923).  Three months later in June, a long-term, League-
backed loan was floated in London, New York, Paris and elsewhere and the Austrian currency
was formally linked to gold.  Norman saw the Austrian mission as a demonstration of the kind of
cooperative international financial  help which could work and be replicated elsewhere.
20
Hungary came to London seeking similar help in Marc h 1923 and was referred to the
League.  With a settlement of a reparation issue arranged in March 1924, two months later a
bridging short-term loan was taken by the Bank of England, a large long-term, League-backed
loan was placed internationally, and a fixed link to gold emerged.
21   League long-term loans
were also the outcome of stabilization missions to Greece (1924, 1928),  Danzig (1925, 1927),
Bulgaria (1926, 1928) and Estonia (1927).  In total £81.2 million in long term, League of Nation
backed, loans were placed.  Britain absorbed 49.1% and the U. S. 19.1%.  Austria, Belgium,
Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, Holland, Hungary, Italy, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland
absorbed shares of 1-6%.
22   Norman and  Strong's support of this type of international
cooperation was clearly evident.
                                                                                                                                                                                       
example is Norman's memorandum listing the general principals of central banking, drafted by Norman sometime in
1921, reviewed and amended by Strong: Sayers (1976, 74-5).
20 .  Sayers (1976, 168-171)
21 .  Sayers (1976, 172-173).
22 .   Eichengreen (1989a, 119).17
Key Country Support for Key Country Restorations.    The return of the gold standard in
the financially troubled principal European economies in the 1920s was also generally supported
by international advice and cooperation.  However, in these important cases the international
aspects of their return were directly in the hands of the principal financial powers.  Such was the
circumstance for Germany (1924) and Britain (1925).  Two financial powers of the second rank ,
Belgium (1925) and Italy (1927), were also helped by the principal financial powers.  The
principal exception to cooperation among the key monetary powers concerns the French run up
to de facto restoration in December 1926 and its de  jure restoration in June 1927.   As
Eichengreen has recently suggested, the particularly acute fiscal and currency crisis in France
created a very strong attachment to a purely gold reserve which conditioned their de facto return
to gold in December 1926 and de  jure  return in June 1927 and their attempt to pursue this created
riffs with the British and others.
23
As early as 1919, Strong suggested to Norman that if the principal financial powers first
cooperated to stabilize their own government finances and restore the gold standard amongst
themselves, it would then be far easier for the other nations to find guidance and resources to
stabilize and restore the gold standard following the principal financial powers.
24
Indeed, American involvement was crucial in the 1923 international commission  to help
Germany deal with her  reparations obligations and get beyond the national and international log
jams that produced its devastating post-war hyperinflation.  Its outcome, the  Dawes Plan,
depended critically on official U. S. support and  private U. S. participation in the  Dawes Loan of
800 million gold marks of foreign currency.  Negotiated over the summer of 1924, it was issued
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in New York, London, Paris and other European capital markets in October.  The United States
absorbed half of the loan ($110 million) and the United Kingdom took a quarter; France,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland took the rest.  In the same month, the
new gold mark was  repegged to gold.
Britain's own return to gold in April 1925 was strongly supported  by Strong and the New
York capital market.  A fundamental condition for such a return was a deflation of British prices
relative to the United States, which proved elusive despite secularly high unemployment rates,
the Bank of England's vigilant positioning of its discount rate and occasional foreign loan
embargoes.  However, the longer Britain waited the more likely it was that the foreign exchange
reserves of newly stabilized currencies would be deposited in New York, not London.  Indeed, in
the winter of 1924-1925 first Australia and South Africa and then Switzerland and the
Netherlands put Britain on notice that they wished to complete their post-war financial
stabilization by restoring the gold standard.
25
On April 28, 1925, Churchill announced that Bri tain was back on the gold standard at
$4.86 to the pound. The Bank of England had £153 millions in gold reserves, virtually the
amount recommended by the  Cunliffe Committee.  Significantly, credits of $300 millions had
been arranged, if needed, consisting of a $100 million credit from J. P. Morgan and other
American banking houses and a $200 million  repo line of gold from a number of Federal
Reserve Banks for two years.
As things evolved, the American credits were not used but Norman did find it necessary
to arrange a private embargo on foreign loans from November 1924 to facilitate the expected
return and an embargo on colonial loans was added two months after the April 1925 restoration.
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Only in November 1925 was the situation thought sufficiently stable to lift the embargoes.
26
These embargoes most likely hastened the decline of the London international capital markets
and the shift to the unfettered environment of New York.
The Money Doctors.   The third international force for monetary stabilization was the
missions of Princeton economist Kemmerer and other private consultants.  Since Kemmerer
regularly corresponded and met with Strong of the New York Federal Reserve Bank and the
State Department concerning his missions, it would appear that he was comfortable operating
within the parameters of American monetary and diplomatic policy.  Yet, the governments hiring
Kemmerer clearly wanted an independent U. S. consultant, not a seconded official of the U. S.
central bank or its diplomatic corps.  That these governments wanted a foreigner suggests that
they were trying to avoid petty political attacks directed at native experts; that they wanted  a U.
S. consultant suggests they wanted access to American financial markets.  Kemmerer, it was well
known, had excellent contacts with Dillon, Reed.  In the 1920s, Kemmerer headed or jointly
chaired missions to Peru (1922), Colombia (1923), Guatemala (1924), South Africa (1924-1925),
Chile (1925), Poland (1926), and Bolivia (1927), as well as serving on the  Dawes Commission to
Germany in 1925.
Kemmerer's agenda was virtually the same as the missions of the League of Nations:
fiscal stabilization, creating an independent central bank, and stabilizing the currency in terms of
gold, de facto and de  jure.
27   Measured by whether  Kemmerer's missions resulted in the
restoration or establishment of a gold standard, the evidence suggests that it was usually the case
                                                        
26 .  From June to November 1925 only one Empire loan was issued in London and not one foreign government loan was
issued during the whole of 1925: Atkin (1977, 51).
27 .   Eichengreen (1989b, 60-64).20
that within a year of a Kemmerer mission, the local currency was stabilized in terms of gold.
28
With regard to the effects the Kemmerer missions had on enhanced foreign dollar loans,
Eichengreen found a significant effect on national government loans within three years of a
Kemmerer mission.
29
Kemmerer's efforts may have indirectly had a significant effect on the return to gold of a
key economy.  The advice of the  Vissering-Kemmerer commission formed an important basis for
the South African government's decision to inform Great Britain that South Africa wanted to
return to gold as soon as possible.  As was noted earlier, the privately expressed desire of South
Africa, Australia, Switzerland and the Netherlands to return to gold in late 1924 and early 1925
put substantial pressure on Great Britain to speed its own return in April 1926.
Thus with the efforts of the  great powers, especially the United Kingdom and the United
States, the League of Nations, and private missions, the gold standard was restored as a gold
exchange standard.  Many countries accompanied their return to convertibility with deliberate
actions to attain fiscal probity including establishing a central bank and a balanced budget.  Also
because of the severity of the wartime inflation and dislocations and the rising power of labor,
many countries returned to gold at devalued parities.  The United Kingdom was a principal
advocate and architect of the restoration of the gold standard, presumably to restore its position
as the world’s premier capital market.  Yet as events unfolded, she was denied this role and the
mantle shifted to New York.  This transformation reflected the United Kingdom’s weakened
financial status after the war manifested in embargoes on international lending and the decision
to return to gold at the original  parity which overvalued sterling.
                                                        
28 .  See Eichengreen (1989b) for a list of Kemmerer missions and Eichengreen (1992, 188-190) for Kemmerer's
exhaustive list of nations on the gold standard, 1919-1937.21
3.   The Mantle Shifts
Prior to World W ar I the United States was a debtor nation, similar to Canada, Australia,
and other developing countries that were absorbing European capital and exploiting their natural
resources. There was, however, considerable U.S. foreign investment, especially towards the end
of the nineteenth century. Most, was direct investment by American corporations that were
expanding their operations abroad . There was also some foreign portfolio investment.
30  The
rapid growth in both direct investments and foreign security holdings in the period 1900 to 1914,
moreover, suggests that the United States would have become a major foreign investor, and
would have changed from debtor to creditor ,  even in the absence of World War I.
31
World War I, however, accelerated this transition.  The outbreak of the war in Europe
brought foreign governments into the American market seeking loans. During the period of U.S.
neutrality these loans were generally short term. Indeed, the volume  of  short-term lending grew
so rapidly that in January 1917 the Federal Reserve felt compelled to warn the banks against
acquiring too many foreign short-term loans.
American entry into the war led to massive foreign loans by the US government. The
mechanism was simple. The Treasury itself became the purchaser of long-term bonds issued by
the Allies. During the war the Capital Issues Committee controlled sales of foreign securities on
private markets.
                                                                                                                                                                                       
29 .   The missions seem to have had little or no effect on short term or non-government foreign dollar loans: Eichengreen
(1989b, 66-67).
30  Direct Investment rose from 635 million to 2652 million between 1897 and 1914;  secruity holdings rose from 50
million to 862 million.  (Lewis 1938, 445).
31  The surge in U.S. foreign investment and its political ramifications are discussed in (Davis and Cull, 1994, 92-
107).22
After the war, U.S. foreign investment boomed. Europe had been devastated by the war
and needed capital to restore plant and equipment. Europe also needed capital to reconstruct
financial relationships; going on the gold standard meant holding gold or foreign exchange
convertible into gold. Britain, although a  victor, and possessing lending institutions built up over
centuries, was drained by the war. America was ready to replace Britain as the center of lending
for developing countries.
Table 1 shows the basic dimensions of U.S. foreign lending during the twenties.  Over the
years 1919 to 1932 some $5.2 billion (at face value) in national and provincial government
securities, our focus in this paper, were floated in the American market. At market prices the
figure would be closer to $5 billion. The total, which includes corporate and municipal securities
as well as nationals and provincials, was about $9 billion at face value. Most of these were long-
term (more than five years) bonds. These were dollar bonds, so that exchange risk was being
assumed, at least from a legal point of view, by the borrower.
Issues were substantial even in 1919. National and Provincial issues peaked in 1924,
while total issues, driven by corporates, peaked in 1927. National and Provincial flotations
declined sharply in 1929 as investors focused on the soaring returns in the stock market, revived
in 1930, and then collapsed as the Great Depression took hold. The purpose of the loans changed
over the twenties. The earliest loans were refunding loans needed to finance short-term
obligations incurred during the war, and reconstruction loans needed to finance rebuilding of
capital damaged in the war, especially railways. Later came stabilization loans, including the
Dawes  plan loans to Germany which helped establish the post-hyperinflation German currency.
And last came what might be called development loans, directed at a wide range of countries,
with the purpose  of  providing  social overhead capital.23
The list of countries that sought and obtained dollar loans in the American market in the
twenties is a long one. It included major European powers such as France and Germany, smaller
European countries such as Bulgaria and Lithuania, South American countries such as Argentina,
Brazil, and Chile, and many others. These bonds were distributed by a small number of
investment banking houses. J.P. Morgan & Co. was the most important, serving as the lead firm
on perhaps half the issues. The others important players were Kuhn,  Loeb; Dillon, Read;
National City Company; and J.W.  Seligman.
The central factor behind the growth of the market was simply that there was good
business to be done. Foreigners wanted to borrow; Americans (and few others) had capital to
lend. Behind the scenes the U.S. government offered encouragement. Foreign lending was seen
as a way of promoting a stable political equilibrium in Europe, and of extending American
influence in other regions. Beginning in 1921, the State  Department  reviewed proposed
flotations.
32  Generally, the Department offered no objection to a proposed loan, but there  were  a
few exceptions based on political considerations. The Department for example, did not object to
Japanese loans if the money was to be used in Japan, but it did object if the money would be
used in Manchuria.
During the Great Depression many of the foreign governments that the United States had
lent to in the twenties defaulted, including Germany, Bulgaria, Brazil, Cuba, and China.  Many
municipal and corporate borrowers, of course, defaulted as well. Inevitably, it was argued that
lending standards had been lax in the  twenties, that they had fallen even further as the lending
“mania” progressed, and that the resulting defaults had contributed to the severity of the
Depression.  On the surface it seemed that although the United States had taken over the role of
                                                        
32  Cleveland and Huertas, (1985, 147).24
principal overseas lender from the British, they had not acquired the expertise that the British had
accumulated over a century of practice.  It also suggests that US lenders may not have followed
the same criteria to evaluate foreign loans as the British.
A number of pieces of evidence were adduced to show that standards had been lax. First
there was the quantitative evidence. By the end of the 1930s billions of dollars worth of bonds
were in default, and the majority were issues made later in the twenties rather than earlier. There
was also an abundance of qualitative evidence.  One oft-repeated story concerns the son of the
President of Peru who was later convicted of “illegal enrichment” in connection with a Peruvian
issue. Another frequently repeated story concerns Cuba. Initially it’s foreign borrowing was
intended to complete a road running from one end of Cuba to the other, a badly managed project
perhaps, but one that could be justified as a productivity increasing investment in social overhead
capital. Later, as the willingness of Americans to lend became evident, the Cubans borrowed for
less justifiable purposes – a new Capitol with a gilt dome.
33   And, as with the stock market, one
could cite many warnings by wise men that speculation was running wild in the foreign bond
market, and that a day of reckoning was at hand.
The problem with this evidence, of course, is that it is hard to know what would have
happened in the absence of the Great Depression. Although some borrowers would have
defaulted, the number defaulting would have been far smaller, fewer scandals would have been
detected, and the warnings of the  Casandras would have been forgotten. Foreign loans in the
twenties did contain substantial risk premiums. To say whether those premiums were
“reasonable” would mean knowing a reasonable estimate  of  the probability of an extremely
unlikely event: a collapse of the American financial system in which the Federal Reserve failed
to act as lender of last resort followed by a prolonged world-wide depression.25
Some attempts have bee n made to address the standards issue. Friedman and Schwartz
(1963, 245-8) provide a perceptive analysis of the standards debate, and of the studies, such as
Mintz (1951), available at the time.
34  Friedman and Schwartz argue that the real problem might
not have been excessively low credit standards in the 1920s, but rather excessively high
standards in the early 1930s, especially at the Federal Reserve.
The critics of U.S. foreign lending in the 1920s, both at the time and since, seem to have
assumed that it should have been relatively straightforward for lenders to assess the quality of a
foreign issue, a matter mostly of judging the particular project that was to make use of the
borrowed capital, combined, perhaps, with some judgment about the weight of the borrowers’
total debt burden. Judging the soundness of the issue of a sovereign borrower, however, involves
a  difficult  problem of asymmetric information. The real question is how much a particular
country will be willing to suffer in hard times to repay obligations contracted in good times, a
piece of information that is hard for lenders to know, whether the borrower is a local
businessman or a sovereign nation.
Our research explores how the US capital markets in the 1920s attempted to solve the
asymmetric information problem. Our hypothesis is that the US lenders looked at whether a
country had made the effort to go on the gold standard, as was the case when Great Britain was
the principal lender, and if possible to do so at the prewar price of gold.
                                                                                                                                                                                       
33   Lewis, 1938, pp. 383-87.
34  Mintz computed an annual default index based on the ultimate status of a borrower, rather than of a particular
loan, thus adjusting for loans that were not defaulted because they had been substantially repaid before the
depression, and concluded that standards had fallen in the late 1920s.26
4.   Methodology, Data, Econometric Evidence
In this section we present evidence for the “good housekeeping seal of approval”
hypothesis for the interwar period. Our approach is to estimate a very simple pooled cross-
section time series regression  for  40 countries and seven years of data.
35  The regression tests to
see if adherence to the gold standard affected the interest rate that was charged on dollar
denominated loans to sovereign borrowers in the U.S. capital market, holding constant other
fundamentals. We also ascertain whether in addition to adhering to gold convertibility it mattered
whether a country had devalued its currency before restoring the gold standard.
This methodology is somewhat different from that followed in Bordo and Rockof f
(1996).  In that study which covered the classical gold standard period 1870 to 1914 we had a 40
year sample of data for only 9 countries. In that study most of the variation came from the time
dimension in contrast to this study which relies mainly on the cross-section variation.
36
The interest  rates which we use come from a study by  Cleona Lewis (1938).
37  She
presented a comprehensive tabulation of new issues in the U.S. markets and the rates charged for
approximately 40 countries.
38   Its likely that these were not the only countries that were
borrowing in international markets. But this was, as discussed in section 3, the most important
bond market in the interwar period. The data is organized so that we only use observations for
years in which the countries actually borrowed. We do not know why they did or did not borrow.
A decision not to borrow might reflect bad credit, and an inability to borrow at low rates, or
                                                        
35  For the  data  sources and definitions used see the Data Appendix.
36  In that study we estimated the Betas from  a CAPM regression as well as the simpler regressions reported here.
37  We thank Barry  Eighengreen for drawing our attention to this source.
38   The countries in our sample are (in Europe) Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,  Danzig , Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Rumania, Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia; (in the New World) Canada and Newfoundland, Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti,
Panama, El Salvador; and (in the rest of the world), Australia, China, the Dutch East Indies, Japan, Liberia, and the
Phillipine  Islands.27
simply an abundance of domestic savings.  During this period there were also a number of
important stabilization loans offered under the auspices of the League of Nations as mentioned in
section 3 above.  In the empirical work described below we omit these loans because they do not
fit exactly into the framework of our hypothesis—they were made by private lenders but were
officially backed on political grounds to help countries stabilize their inflation rates and return to
gold.  We also did our calculations including these loans in the sample and the results were quite
similar.
We used a number  of institutional variables to isolate various dimensions of the “good
housekeeping seal” hypothesis.  These include dummy variables to ascertain whether it mattered
whether a country was on or off gold, whether it had devalued, whether it followed a gold
exchange standard or a pure gold standard, whether a gold coin or gold bullion standard.
The third set of variables is a set of macroeconomic fundamentals that one might think
would be important in judging a country’s ability to service its debts.  These variables include a
measure of monetary policy (the rate of growth of the stock of money less the rate of growth of
real output), the inflation rate, a measure of fiscal policy (the ratio of government expenditures
less receipts relative to GNP), the ratio of the current account deficit relative to GDP, the rate of
change of the exchange rate, the central bank discount rate, the ratio of gold reserves to total
reserves, and the ratio of total reserves to imports. The definitions are shown in Table 2.
Befor e we examine the regressions it is useful to look at the interest rates for our sample
of countries dividing the sample into the countries that were on gold and off gold in the years
1920-1929.
39  As can clearly be seen from figure 1 the interest rate for gold standard adherents
was  less than for non-adherents. Before 1925 the difference is about 100 basis points and
                                                        
39  The sample presented in these figures excludes stabilization loans.28
afterwards closer to 200. A further demarcation, as shown in figure 2, divided the sample into 3
groups: off gold, on gold and devalued, and on gold and not devalued.  From figure 2 it can
clearly be seen that interest rates for the last group are considerably lower than for the other
groups.
40  Furthermore, after 1925 the interest rates for the on gold and devalued group is about
100 basis points below the off-gold group. These results suggest that good gold standard
orthodoxy commanded a very high premium. But even attempting to go back to gold at a
devalued parity was better than not doing so.
The advantage to a country of returning to gold can  be seen in many individual cases.
Thus for example Canada paid 5.53 percent when off gold and 4.65 percent when on gold;
Australia paid 6.9 and 5.17; Chile 8.05 and 6.75; Denmark 6.93 and 4.8, and Italy 7.8 and 6.25.
Indeed figure 3 shows for the whole sample, the interest rates paid in the two years before going
back onto gold and the rates paid in the three years after.  As is clearly evident there is a dramatic
decline.
We turn now to the regression results. In Table 3 we  regress the interest rates on the on-
off gold dummy, the dollar amount of the issue scaled by GDP, and a number of macroeconomic
variables. All the regressions also include year dummies which to save on space are not
presented. The first equation is the simple benchmark  equation which includes only the gold
adherence dummy. As can be seen, this variable is significant and has the predicted negative
sign. Equation 2 adds in the size of the issue and the following fundamentals: inflation, fiscal
policy, foreign trade, and the exchange rate. As in equation (1) the gold adherence dummy is
significant, indeed it is more significant and negative, and two of the other variables are
significant, inflation and the exchange rate. We have also included the White t  statistics which
adjust for possible  heterocedasticity. These results are similar, although the significance of the
                                                        
40  Some new countries did not have a prewar parity to go back to. They are omitted from the sample at this point.29
on-off dummy is higher and the exchange rate is now significant at the 5 percent level, but with a
perverse sign. Equation (3) substitutes our measure of monetary policy for the inflation rate. As
in the previous regression this variable is significant.
In Table 4 for the gold standard adherence dummy we substitute two dummies: countries
that were on gold that did not devalue, and countries that were on gold and did devalue. The on-
gold not devalued dummy is significant at the  1 percent level and is considerably stronger than
the on-gold dummy in Table 3. Also as in the previous table the inflation variable is strongly
significant.  The only other variable that is significant is the exchange rate in equation (3).
Finally, Table 5 repeats the equations from the previous two tables, except that we add in
two additional fundamental variables: the ratio of gold reserves to total reserves and the ratio of
total reserves to imports. The key finding in this table, as in table 4, is that the on-gold-not-
devalued dummy comes in with the right sign, is strongly significant, and large in magnitude
(over 200 basis points).
41
As a test of the robustness of our results we ran a similar set  of regressions (but do not
present the results here) on a different set of interest rates. These are long term bond yields for
ten countries used in Bordo and Schwartz (1996). Our results were quite similar to those in Table
3, but somewhat weaker.
In s um, the results for our measures of gold adherence, especially orthodox gold
adherence-- that is returning to the prewar parity-- we believe provides strong support for the
“good housekeeping seal” hypothesis. As in our earlier study the variables that one might at first
                                                        
41  We ran regressions similar to those in Tables 4 and 5 including dummy variables to ascertain whether it mattered
if a country was on a gold exchange or pure gold standard and whether it was on  a gold coin or gold bullion
standard.  It did not appear, however, that these further distinctions had a significant impact.  Finally we ran the
regressions using  one year lags on the fundamental variables.  The results were similar.30
think should serve as fundamentals, with the principal exceptions of inflation and monetary
policy, did not turn out to be that strong.
5.   Conclusion
Although this paper tests the “good housekeeping seal of approval hypothesis” that tw o
of us worked on previously, we were all somewhat skeptical that it would apply to the 1920’s.
The interwar monetary system has generally received a bad press.  It got off to a bad start, as
many countries delayed in returning to gold, and many returned at devalued parities.  It lasted for
only a brief period before ending in the disaster of the Great Depression.  Moreover, it was not a
true gold standard, but rather a gold exchange  standard which by definition made it more fragile.
It has been characterized as having major fundamental  flaws which led to a deflationary bias, and
most importantly it has been indicted because members had less of a credible attachment to gold
orthodoxy.  Yet there is significant recent  evidence which suggests that when the gold standard
functioned, arbitrage in the short-term capital markets was as efficient as it had been before
1914, and there were substantial long-term capital flows in the 1920’s.
Yet despite these reservations, the regression results we report in secti on 4 were very
encouraging for our hypothesis.  The on-gold-off-gold dummy was as significant as what we
found for the pre-1914 period, and the fact that the coefficient on the on-gold-never-devalued
dummy was even stronger suggests that adherence to gold standard orthodoxy was highly prized
by US lenders.  However, the fact that adhering to gold even at a devalued parity was valued
suggests that the markets attached importance to being part of the fixed exchange rate system
independent of following gold standard orthodoxy.31
The general insignificance of the other fundamentals, with the principal exceptions of
inflation and monetary policy, echoed what we found in our earlier study.  We do not have a
ready explanation, but it is possible that the markets preferred the gold standard seal  over data
that had only recently become available, and that they could not easily evaluate.
While we believe these results to be compelling, a number of reservations are in order.
These include the fact that we could have tested for the influence of other fundamentals such as
the political variables considered by  Eichengreen (1992) and Simmons (1994): left wing versus
right wing governments, longevity of the government, and so on.  Or other variables such as
prior commercial linkages between the lenders and the borrowers, geography, and a common
language, and culture.
While our results show that countries would have received a large gain by going back to
gold at the prewar parity it is understandable why they chose not to do so.  In most cases
returning to the prewar parity would have required substantial deflation and likely declining real
activity.   In the face of a dramatically changed political economy with the rise of the left and the
power of organized labor, the costs of pursuing such a strategy likely outweighed the benefits
that we have identified in terms of the spread between the coefficient on the on-off-gold dummy
and the on-gold-never-devalued dummy.  A case in point is France which even at the lowest
point of postwar inflation in 1919 would have had to deflate by a multiple of the amount that the
British and Americans deflated.32
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Appendix: Data Sources
In this study we use 1920-1929 annual data for the following 40 countries:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway,
Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the
United States and Yugoslavia.
Bond Issues (The value of the issues in million of U.S. dollars) :  Lewis, (1938),   pp. 632-636.
CPI (Consumer Price Index): Mitchell, (1993) ,  pp. 696-699, 700-702; Mitchell (1992), pp. 848-
849; Mitchell, (1995),  pp. 930, 935, 939.  (For Mexico and Yugoslavia, we use WPI (Wholesale
Price Index) ,  Mitchell, (1993),  pp. 691; Mitchell, (1992),  pp. 842.
Devalued or Not (An institutional dummy variable indicating whether or not a country has
devalued after returning to the gold standard): Bordo and Schwartz, (1996) ,  pp. 20-22.
Exchange Rates (Cents per unit of domestic currency): Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, (1944), pp. 662-682.
Exports (In domestic currency in millions): Mitchell, (1993), pp. 420-431, 435-438; Mitchell
(1992), pp. 558-562; Mitchell (1995), pp. 507, 524, 525, 537.
Foreign Exchange Reserves (In millions of U.S. dollars): Bordo and  Eichengreen, (1998), pp.
74-75.
Gold Reserves (In millions of U.S. dollars): Bordo and  Eichengreen, (1998), pp. 74-75.
Gold Type (An institutional dummy variable indicating types of the gold standard—gold
bullion, gold coin, gold exchange and etc.):  Eichengreen, (1992) ,  pp. 188-190.
Government Expenditure (In domestic currency in millions): Mitchell, (1993) ,  pp. 653-664,
659-662; Mitchell, (1992),  pp. 799-801; Mitchell, (1995), pp. 872, 882, 887.
Government Revenue (In domestic currency in millions): Mitchell, (1993), pp. 668-677, 680-
682; Mitchell, (1992), pp. 816-825; Mitchell, (1995) ,  pp. 894, 906, 914.
Imports (In domestic currency in millions): Mitchell, (1993), pp. 420-431, 435-438; Mitchell,
(1992), pp. 558-562; Mitchell, (1995), pp. 507, 524, 525, 537.
Interest Rates (The rates of interest in percent on new issues of dollar denominated bonds):
Lewis, (1938), pp. 632-636.36
Money Supply (Depending on the availability of data, we use M1 or M2): Mitchell, (1992)
(1993) (1995) ,  Bordo, (1993),   Cavallo and  Mundlak, (1993),  International Financial Statistics
Yearbooks, Various Years; IBGE (1990).
Nominal GDP (In domestic currency in millions): Mitchell, (1993) ,  pp. 748-775; Mitchell,
(1992),  pp. 889-912; Mitchell, (1995),  pp. 987-1022.
On Gold or Not (An institutional dummy variable indicating whether or not a country has
returned to the Gold Standard):  Eichengreen (1992) ,  pp. 188-190.
Real GDP (In domestic currency in millions) :  Mitchell, (1992),  pp. 748-775; Mitchell, (1992),
pp. 889-912; Mitchell, (1995),  pp. 987-1022.</ref_section>37
Table 1
Long Term Foreign Dollar Loans Made by The United States
(Millions of Dollars, 1919-1932)






1919 534.4 17 517.4 639.1 25.4 613.7
1920 290.1 3.6 286.5 421.9 20.2 401.7
1921 365.2 44 321.2 526.3 57.1 469.2
1922 509.9 139 370.9 716.1 173.6 542.5
1923 231.9 54 177.9 329.5 72.8 256.7
1924 676.9 57.7 619.2 908.6 103.6 805
1925 551.6 114.2 437.4 918.4 139 779.4
1926 436.7 105.5 331.2 884.1 160.3 723.8
1927 584.8 63.5 521.31238.9 157.8 1081.1
1928 486.3 256.1 230.21165.1 404.5 760.6
1929 97.4 380.6 -283.2372.8 440.1 -67.3
1930 432.7 120.1 312.6 757.2 285.8 471.4
1931 75.1 217.9 -142.8198.8 345.3 -146.5
1932 0 151 -151 0.7 333.6 -332.9
TOTAL 5273 1724.2 3548.8 9077.5 2719.1 6358.4
Notes: Bonds are at Face value.
Source: Compiled from  Cleona Lewis, 1938, p. 630.Table 2
Definitions of The Variables
On Gold A Dummy Variable, 1 if a country fits the criterion
On Gold and Devalued A Dummy Variable, 1 if a country fits the criterion
On Gold not Devalued A Dummy Variable, 1 if a country fits the criterion
Gold Coin and Bullion A Dummy Variable, 1 if a country fits the criterion
Institutional Variables Gold Exchange A Dummy Variable, 1 if a country fits the criterion
Gold Coin and Bullion not Devalued A Dummy Variable, 1 if a country fits the criterion
Gold Coin and Bullion and Devalued A Dummy Variable, 1 if a country fits the criterion
Gold Exchange not Devalued A Dummy Variable, 1 if a country fits the criterion
Gold Exchange and Devalued A Dummy Variable, 1 if a country fits the criterion
Monetary Policy Money supply growth rate less real GDP growth rate
Inflation Rate of change of the CPI
Fiscal Policy The change in government debt divided by nominal GDP
Macroeconomic Variables Foreign Trade The trade balance divided by nominal GDP
Exchange Rate The exchange rate
Gold Reserves/Total Reserves Gold reserves divided by total reserves
Total Reserves/ Imports Total reserves divided by Imports
* Growth rates are calculated using log differences.
Scale Variable Issues/GDP Bond issues in dollars divided by nominal GDP39
Table 3
POOLED REGRESSIONS
DEPENDENT VARIABLES :INTEREST RATES  (1920--1929)
Regressions         Intercept     on Gold     Issue/GDP     Monetary Policy     Inflation     Fiscal Policy     Foreign Trade     Exchange Rate     Adjusted R
2       N
       (1 )                    7.85**       -1.25*                                                                                                                                                                      0.23              53
                               (9.74)         (2.57)
       (2 )                    7.87           -1.28           -18.74                                             6.11                 7.91                1.25                    0.14                     0.42              53
                              (10.65)**    (2.72)**      (1.37)                                            (2.33)*            (1.62)              (0.34)                 (1.03)
                               [  9.03]**    [3.73]**      [1.35]                                            [2.80]**          [1.51]              [0.35]                 [2.29]*
       (3 )                    8.05           -1.44           -20.41                 4.33                                             8.37                 2.15                   0.17                     0.39              49
                              (10.63)**    (2.85)**       (1.33)               (2.26)*                                        (1.47)               (0.56)                (1.36)
                              [10.01]**    [4.26]**       [1.62]               [3.00]**                                      [1.21]               [0.62]                [2.96]**
*    significant at 5 percent level.
**  significant at 1 percent level
Note: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. Absolute values of White t-statistics are in brackets.
          Estimation results of year dummies are omitted in the table.40
Table 4
POOLED REGRESSIONS
DEPENDENT VARIABLES :INTEREST RATES  (1920--1929)
                                                 on Gold     on Gold
Regressions         Intercept      not  Dev.     and  Dev.     Issue/ GDP     Monetary Policy     Inflation     Fiscal Policy     Foreign Trade     Exchange Rate     AdjR
2    N
       (1 )                    7.56**       -2.24**       -0.32                                                                                                                                                                     0.54     53
                             (12.14)         (5.41)          (0.79)
       (2 )                    7.46           -2.03           -0.35            -3.32                                               5.74              6.18                    2.45                       0.07            0.65      53
                             (12.83)**     (5.15)**      (0.86)          (0.30)                                             (2.81)**       (1.61)                 (0.84)                    (0.66)
                             [15.03]**     [4.87]**      [0.98]          [0.29]                                             [2.98]**       [1.24]                 [0.86]                    [1.28]
       (3 )                    7.43           -1.95           -0.33             2.50                     1.82                                         4.57                  4.58                        0.13            0.57      49
                             (11.34)**     (4.40)**      (0.64)          (0.18)                   (1.05]                                      (0.93)               (1.40)                     (0.11)
                             [15.75]**     [5.30]**      [0.85]          [0.19]                   [1.13]                                      [0.76]               [1.35]                     [2.13]*
*     significant at 5 percent level.
**  significant at 1 percent level.
Note: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses.  Absolute values of White t-statistics are in brackets.
          Estimation results of year dummies are omitted in the table.41
Table 5
POOLED REGRESSIONS
DEPENDENT VARIABLES :INTEREST RATES (1920--1929)
                                                              on Gold      on Gold                            Inflation/      Fiscal     Foreign   Exchange.       Gold  Reserve        Total Res .
Regressions     Intercept     on Gold     not  Dev.      and   Dev.     Issue/ GDP   M Policy       Policy     Trade      Rate               Total Reserve.      Import      AdjR
2        N
       (1 )                 7.17          -1.16                                                 -38.38              6.66          4.82       -0.15         -0.09                    0.95              -0.13        0.28      38
                           (4.58)***   (1.27)                                                 (1.73)*          (1.06)        (0.64)     (0.02)       (0.04)                  (0.69)             (0.81)
                           [5.01]***   [1.97]*                                               [1.97]*          [1.36]        [0.71]     [0.02]       [0.04]                  [0.75]             [1.33]
      (1) '                  7.12          -1.37                                                -38.24              2.70         -1.08        3.96         -1.27                    1.37              -0.15        0.24       34
                            (4.68)***   (1.68)                                                (1.47)            (0.71)       (0.11)      (0.57)       (0.63)                  (0.98)            (0.92)
                            [5.29]***   [4.48]***                                          [1.76]*          [0.80]       [0.17]      [0.72]       [0.52]                  [1.10]            [1.53]
      (2 )                  7.59                            -2.24            -0.36           -16.56             7.17           5.16        5.37          0.18                    -0.03              0.08         0.59      37
                            (6.38)***                    (3.06)***     (0.50)           (0.91)            (1.50)        (0.91)     (0.96)       (0.10)                  (0.03)            (0.56)
                            [6.45]***                    [2.60]**       [0.50]           [0.90]            [1.37]        [0.66]     [0.97]       [0.10]                  [0.03]            [0.70]
      (2) '                  7.01                            -2.11           -0.09             -1.33            -1.39         -5.39       10.44         -1.13                    0.55               0.00        0.59      34
                            (6.25)***                     (3.35)***   (0.14)            (0.06)           (0.47)        (0.79)     (1.95)*      (0.76)                  (0.52)            (0.01)
                            [7.73]***                     [4.33]***   [0.21]            [0.07]           [0.52]        [0.99]     [2.19]**    [0.55]                  [0.55]            [0.01]
*       significant at 10 percent level.
**    significant at 5 percent level.
** *  significant at 1 percent level.
Note: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. Absolute values of White t-statistics are in brackets.
          In regression (1)' and (2)', the variable Inflation is replaced by the variable Monetary Policy.
          Estimation results of year dummies are omitted in the table.42
Average Interest Rates: 
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Figure 143
Average Interest Rate: Off Gold, On Gold and 
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Figure 244
 The Rate of Interest Before and After 
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